MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT=20
RESOLUTION
on improving safety at sea
2003/2235(INI))
The European Parliament,
=E2=80=93 having regard to =
Article 31 of the=20
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which =
states:=20
'Every worker has the right to working conditions which =
respect his=20
or her health, safety and dignity',
=E2=80=93 having regard to =
its decision of 6=20
November 2003 to set up a temporary committee on improving =
safety at=20
sea(1),
=E2=80=93 having regard to =
its resolutions of=20
21 November 2002, 19 December 2002 and 23 September 2003 =
concerning=20
the Prestige disaster(2) and its previous resolutions =
on safety=20
at sea,
=E2=80=93 having regard to =
the public=20
hearings of the Temporary Committee on improving safety at =
sea held=20
on 1-2 December 2003 and 22 January and 18 February =
2004,
=E2=80=93 having regard to =
the submissions in=20
writing by the speakers invited to the public hearings,
=E2=80=93 having regard to =
its resolution of=20
12 February 2004 on the fate of the Greek and Filipino =
members of=20
the crew of the Tasman Spirit in Karachi, Pakistan(3),
=E2=80=93 having regard to =
the exchange of=20
views between a delegation from the Temporary Committee on =
improving=20
safety at sea and the master of the Prestige on 5 February =
2004 in=20
Barcelona,
=E2=80=93 having regard to =
the decisions=20
adopted by the IMO at the 23rd session of its Assembly in=20
November-December 2003,
=E2=80=93 having regard to =
Rule 150(2) of its=20
Rules of Procedure,
=E2=80=93 having regard to =
the report of the=20
Temporary Committee on improving safety at sea =
(A5-0257/2004),
A. whereas various =
incidents in=20
European waters have caused pollution since the Erika and =
Prestige=20
disasters, such as that involving the Andinet, which lost =
leaky=20
drums containing toxic substances off the coast of the=20
Netherlands,
B. whereas research shows =
that, more=20
than ten years after the Exxon Valdez oil disaster, the =
impact on=20
the environment and the ecosystem is still visible and that=20
short-term solutions such as clean-up operations can in the =
long=20
term make matters even worse, although account must be taken =
of the=20
particular characteristics of the oil carried by the Exxon =
Valdez=20
and the fuel-oil carried by the Prestige, as well as the =
vast=20
differences, in terms of coastline, climate and movement of =
waters,=20
between Alaska and Galicia,
C. whereas major accidents =
are not=20
the only problem: worldwide much of the pollution with =
hydrocarbons=20
caused by ships is due to deliberate discharges, such as =
degassing;=20
whereas, therefore, it is necessary to combat these illegal=20
discharges by introducing a system of appropriate =
penalties,
D. whereas some maritime =
transport=20
operators have made efforts to modernise their fleets and to =
train=20
the seafarers they employ but further initiatives, including =
Community initiatives, are still needed,
E. whereas the Commission =
has=20
promised to put forward in 2004 a new package of measures to =
improve=20
safety at sea, comprising proposals concerning the living =
and=20
working conditions of seafarers; port state and flag state =
control;=20
maritime transport management and information; passenger =
liability=20
and investigations into maritime accidents,
F. whereas the master of =
the=20
Prestige, after having been detained for 83 days and having =
paid=20
security of $ 3.2 m, is still required to report daily to =
the=20
Spanish police,
G. whereas such treatment =
has=20
subsequently been repeated in the ongoing case of the Tasman =
Spirit,
H. having regard to the =
rejection by=20
the court in Corcubi=C3=B3n of the European Parliament's =
request to hear=20
the master during a public hearing in Brussels,
I. whereas, nearly a year =
and a half=20
after the disaster, still no dates have been set for the =
opening of=20
the proceedings against the master,
J. having regard to the =
statements by=20
the master of the Prestige to Parliament concerning (a) the =
poor=20
accessibility of the emergency towing installation because =
of the=20
prevailing conditions, particularly the weather, (b) the =
damage to=20
the engine as a result of which it could not immediately be =
started,=20
(c) the requests by both the master and the rescuers to take =
the=20
vessel to a place of refuge,
K. whereas the exact =
quantities are=20
unclear but before the disaster there was 77 000 tons of =
heavy oil=20
on board the Prestige, it is estimated that 14 000 tons now =
remain=20
there, some 43 000 tons, according to the Spanish =
authorities'=20
statistics, having been washed up and/or cleaned up; whereas =
therefore approximately 20 000 tons are unaccounted for, =
which=20
consequently could still be a threat to the environment and =
the=20
coast,
L. whereas the master of =
the Prestige=20
estimated that 2000-3000 tons of fuel was lost immediately =
after the=20
initial damage to the Prestige, as opposed to the Spanish=20
authorities who estimated that at that time approximately 10 =
000=20
tons was lost,
The Prestige disaster and the =
wreck
1. Deplores the various =
shipping=20
accidents which have occurred since the sinking of the =
Prestige,=20
particularly the disaster involving the freighter Rocknes =
off the=20
coast of Norway, which caused 18 deaths in January 2004; =
calls on=20
the authorities to investigate the causes and the =
circumstances,=20
particularly what role possibly the lack of communication =
skills and=20
the fact that this vessel was double-hulled played in the=20
disaster;
2. Stresses that far more =
attention=20
ought to be devoted to the maintenance and condition of =
vessels, as=20
a poorly maintained double-hulled tanker represents a =
greater=20
potential hazard than a well-maintained single-hulled =
tanker;
3. Expresses its concern =
about the=20
statement by the government commissioner on behalf of the =
Spanish=20
authorities that if a disaster identical to the Prestige =
disaster=20
were to recur, a decision would again be taken to tow the =
vessel=20
away from the coast;
4. Welcomes the sealing =
operation to=20
stop oil leaking from the wreck of the Prestige and the =
specific=20
plans for making the wreck safe; calls on the competent =
authorities=20
to continue their efforts to tackle the problem of the oil =
still=20
present in the sea and the thousands of tons of waste in =
landfills=20
and to put forward a detailed calendar for the extraction =
and=20
treatment of the waste; urges that the expertise gained in =
the=20
process be disseminated and used in tackling any future=20
accidents;
5. Notes with concern that, =
nearly a=20
year and a half after the Prestige disaster, all the =
investigations=20
into the causes and circumstances of the disaster have still =
not=20
been completed or the findings published; notes that the =
findings of=20
the investigation by the Prestige's flag state (the =
Bahamas), for=20
example, are still awaited; urges that agreements be reached =
under=20
the auspices of the IMO on the speedy and independent =
investigation=20
of shipping disasters and that the IMO include this =
requirement in=20
its audit scheme for maritime authorities;
6. Calls on the Spanish =
judicial=20
authorities, on the basis of total respect for the full =
independence=20
of their decision-making and of Article 73 of the Montego =
Bay=20
Convention, to allow the master of the Prestige to return to =
his=20
country pending his trial, and to relax the requirement for =
him to=20
report daily, and as soon as possible to clarify the date on =
which=20
the legal proceedings against the master are to begin, and =
the=20
schedule for these proceedings;
Improving maritime safety at European=20
level
7. Stresses that, in =
response to the=20
Erika and Prestige disasters, important legislative measures =
have=20
been taken to make shipping safer in European waters and =
that rapid=20
and complete introduction and strict enforcement of the =
European=20
rules by the Member States must therefore be a priority; =
deplores=20
the fact, in this connection, that seven Member States =
(Italy,=20
Austria, Luxembourg, Greece, Finland, Belgium and the =
Netherlands)=20
have still not transposed, or have still not completely =
transposed,=20
two crucial directives on port state control and =
classification=20
societies;
8. Considers that, as it is =
also very=20
important to have effective emergency planning on board =
vessels, the=20
Commission should propose measures to ensure that all =
tankers and=20
vessels carrying a significant quantity of oil as fuel =
should be=20
required to maintain a comprehensive vessel emergency =
response plan=20
as part of an EU-wide industry-based Emergency Response =
System;
9. Deplores likewise that =
some Member=20
States have not fully implemented the directive establishing =
a=20
Community vessel traffic monitoring and information system =
and=20
particularly Article 20 thereof, which concerns the =
drawing-up of=20
plans to provide places of refuge for ships in distress(4);
10. Calls on each coastal =
Member=20
State to establish a clear decision-making and command =
structure for=20
dealing with maritime emergencies and an independent =
authority which=20
has the powers and expertise to take the necessary =
decisions, with=20
which all parties concerned must comply, in particular the =
selection=20
and mandatory assignment of an emergency mooring or =
port;
11. Emphasises the =
importance of=20
transnational cooperation in dealing with major maritime =
accidents,=20
based on standing operational networks and clear rules and=20
procedures tested regularly via exercises;
12. Stresses that, when =
considering=20
measures to improve safety at sea, sufficient attention must =
be=20
devoted to particular features of the EU's various sea =
areas, which=20
differ, inter alia, on account of climate: for example, =
special=20
safety requirements apply in the Baltic during the =
winter;
13. Calls for the =
establishment of a=20
European coastguard service equipped with the necessary =
competence=20
and instruments to ensure: (1) maritime safety and the =
protection of=20
the marine environment (including fisheries surveillance),=20
protection against terrorism, piracy and maritime crime; (2) =
strict=20
monitoring of adherence to certain shipping routes and the=20
prosecution of the illegal entry of vessels; (3) the =
swiftest=20
possible coordination of the necessary measures in the event =
of an=20
accident at sea, including the assignment of emergency =
moorings and=20
ports;
14. Welcomes the initiative =
of the=20
Commission to organise a series of visits to Member States =
to verify=20
the existence and contents of plans for dealing with places =
of=20
refuge; calls on the Commission to complete as soon as =
possible its=20
evaluation of the plans submitted and its visits to =
appropriate=20
locations and submit the results of this investigation to =
the=20
Council and the European Parliament and to make a clear =
statement=20
which parts of the plans should be public;
15. Is concerned about the =
increasing=20
transhipment of oil between vessels off the coasts of =
Europe;=20
calls on the Member States therefore, when drawing up =
emergency=20
plans, to take account of the specific risks associated with =
this;
16. Observes that the =
capacity for=20
cleaning up oil at sea has proved inadequate in certain =
areas and=20
that no improvement measures have been taken since the =
sinking of=20
the Prestige; welcomes the fact, therefore, that EMSA is =
being=20
assigned an operational remit in this field and stresses the =
importance of making available the requisite funding to =
carry out=20
this remit;
17. Reiterates its request =
that the=20
Commission make proposals as soon as possible for financial=20
compensation for places of refuge and to make it clear to =
what=20
extent existing international conventions already provide =
for=20
compensation; calls on the Member States and the Union to =
ratify=20
these conventions as soon as possible;
18. Calls on the Commission =
to=20
investigate the scope for introducing mandatory insurance =
for=20
vessels in European waters so that damages and costs of =
places of=20
refuge as well as social and environmental costs in the =
event of an=20
accident can also be recovered from the owners of vessels; =
calls for=20
a proposal for the introduction of an EU-wide common method =
for=20
disaster assessment, with a view to facilitating, as in the =
US,=20
compensation for social or collective damage to the natural=20
heritage, including the deterioration of commercially =
non-viable=20
marine and land biodiversity;
19. Considers that the =
insurance=20
system to be established must cover not only the value of =
the cargo=20
but also risks of potential environmental damage in the =
light of the=20
nature of the cargo;
20. Calls on the Transport =
Council,=20
one year after the publication of the Commission proposal, =
to=20
finally adopt a position on the directive concerning the=20
introduction of penalties (under the criminal law) for =
pollution=20
from ships; stresses its view that a system of penalties is =
crucial=20
in order to combat illegal discharges, but that this must =
not result=20
in a general criminalisation of seafarers, thereby damaging =
the=20
image of their profession;
21. Views with concern the =
limited=20
progress made by certain new Member States in implementing =
European=20
and world rules on maritime safety; notes that there is =
particular=20
concern about the new Member States: the Baltic States, =
Malta and=20
Cyprus; calls on the Commission to continue to monitor =
closely the=20
process of integration of the acquis and calls on the new =
Member=20
States, in particular Malta and Cyprus, to continue their =
efforts=20
and strengthen their maritime administrations;
22. Welcomes the periodic =
publication=20
by the Commission of a black list of vessels which are =
banned from=20
entering European waters and ports; urges the Member States =
to=20
enforce strictly the provisions of the port State control =
Directive=20
on refusal of access and to improve, standardise and step up =
port=20
inspections, while urging the Commission to carry out =
effective=20
controls and to undertake an audit of the classification =
societies,=20
including their subsidiaries and companies part-owned by =
them,=20
introducing penalties for non-compliance with =
obligations;
23. Calls on the Commission =
to=20
promote a detailed study of all chemical products and =
radioactive=20
substances carried by vessels, providing specific =
information on=20
degree of toxicity, chemical composition and =
dangerousness;
24. Calls on the Commission =
to make a=20
proposal for tracing (by means of transponders) containers =
and other=20
loading units containing dangerous goods, so that they can =
be=20
located after being lost at sea; calls on the Commission to =
further=20
develop the SafeSeaNet European data exchange platform in =
order to=20
add new functionalities and integrate new technological=20
developments, such as transponders; urges the Member States =
to fully=20
use this system with a view to closer monitoring of traffic =
and=20
better identification of ships likely to pose a risk to =
safety,=20
security or the environment;
25. Is concerned about the=20
registration and labelling of containers and drums =
containing=20
hazardous chemicals and substances, in view of the loss of a =
highly=20
toxic cargo from the Andinet in the North Sea, when it =
became=20
apparent that the substance in question was not the same as =
that=20
indicated in the bills of lading;
26. Is concerned that the =
partnership=20
and cooperation agreement (PCA) recently concluded between =
Russia=20
and the European Community provides insufficient safeguards =
for=20
maritime safety in the Baltic region; calls on the =
Commission,=20
therefore, to coordinate closely with Member States and the =
European=20
Parliament its continuing negotiations with Russia, with a =
view to=20
developing common criteria to determine conditions of access =
to the=20
Baltic for ships carrying dangerous cargo; considers that =
the=20
outcome of these negotiations should reflect an equal level =
of=20
responsibility for both signatories to protect the marine=20
environment of the Baltic region;
27. Urges the Commission, =
in the=20
promised proposal for a directive on investigating shipping=20
accidents, to provide for a system which will ensure optimal =
exchanges of findings from investigations between Member =
States, the=20
Commission and EMSA and safeguard the independence of=20
investigations, preferably by setting up an independent =
European=20
investigation unit within EMSA;
28. Calls on the Commission =
to=20
examine the possibility of giving EMSA access, under certain =
conditions and in particular unannounced, to vessels for the =
purpose=20
of performing on the spot inspection and examination tasks =
assigned=20
to it and to draft a proposal accordingly, if =
appropriate;
29. Calls, in addition, for =
an=20
increased budgetary allocation for EMSA, so that it can have =
at its=20
service, as soon as possible, a fleet of anti-pollution =
vessels to=20
complement the Member States' efforts, and can also perform =
more=20
effective checks on the activities of the classification=20
societies;
30. Stresses the importance =
of=20
providing the most up-to-date navigational means, such as:=20
Electronic Navigational Charts (ENC), Electronic Chart =
Display and=20
Information System (ECDIS) as well as regularly updated =
information=20
on water depths (especially in areas with restricted water=20
depths);
Improving maritime safety =
worldwide
31. Supports the call by =
the=20
Secretary-General of the IMO for the EU Member States to =
continue=20
playing a full part in the work of the IMO and welcomes the =
outcome=20
of the discussions between the Commissioner responsible for=20
transport and the IMO Secretary-General on the margins of =
the MARE=20
meeting in January 2004 concerning closer cooperation =
between their=20
organisations;
32. Reiterates its request =
to the=20
Council to apply for membership of the IMO for the =
Union;
33. Is concerned about the =
increase=20
in exports of Russian oil via the Baltic and along the =
shores of the=20
EU, as they often make use of the cheapest substandard =
tonnage;=20
welcomes, accordingly, close cooperation between the =
Commission and=20
the IMO, which must check that classification societies are =
carrying=20
out inspections properly and that the certificates issued =
are=20
correct;
34. Understands the concern =
of the=20
Secretary-General of the IMO regarding unilateral and =
regional=20
action by countries outside the framework of the IMO, =
considers,=20
however, that EU action may sometimes be necessary in the =
interests=20
of safety; considers, moreover, that EU measures can act as =
a=20
catalyst within the IMO, as in the case of the accelerated=20
phasing-out of single-hulled tankers;
35. Considers that the =
designation of=20
Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSA) under the auspices =
of the=20
IMO should be accompanied by clear and enforceable rules, =
such as=20
more stringent compulsory reporting, identification of all =
operators=20
and rerouting of high-risk vessels, differentiated according =
to=20
cargo; deplores the action taken by some IMO member states =
to=20
postpone any new designation of PSSA areas;
36. Regrets that up until =
now only=20
three IMO member states have ratified the International =
Convention=20
on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage 2001, of =
which=20
only one is an EU Member State, as any bunker oil spill is a =
threat=20
to the marine environment and its biodiversity, and that =
without=20
full ratification there will be no international framework =
covering=20
pollution damage resulting from a bunker oil spill; to that =
effect=20
urges EU Member States to ratify the convention and the =
Commission=20
to promote such ratification;
37. Calls for the =
establishment of=20
special zones within environmentally sensitive and =
navigationally=20
difficult areas of the Baltic Sea, particularly the Kadet =
Trench,=20
the Skagerrak/Kattegat, the Great Belt and the Sound, which=20
ocean-going vessels, in particular oil tankers, may no =
longer=20
negotiate without a pilot and calls on the Commission and =
the Member=20
States to initiate the necessary measures in the competent=20
international bodies, in particular the IMO;
38. Welcomes the =
recommendation on=20
harmonised rules concerning transport in the Baltic Sea area =
during=20
the winter adopted by the Helsinki Commission for the =
Protection of=20
the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (HELCOM);
39. Rejects, on the other =
hand, the=20
categorical banning of high-risk vessels from the 200-mile =
zone, as=20
this measure is legally contentious, impedes rapid and =
effective=20
assistance to vessels in distress and their crews, and =
causes=20
vessels to make detours, which displaces or even aggravates =
the=20
problem;
40. Reiterates the need to =
revise the=20
International Law of the Sea so as to confer greater powers =
on=20
coastal states to reinforce maritime safety in their =
exclusive=20
economic zones and to improve the protection of the marine=20
environment;
41. Stresses that up to 80% =
of=20
accidents at sea are due to human error, even higher in the =
case of=20
collisions and groundings; considers that the human element =
is=20
multi-faceted; therefore calls on the Commission to address =
the=20
human element issues when adopting a new 'Erika III' =
package, which=20
it has announced for 2004, and urges the introduction of =
compulsory=20
refresher courses and courses on rescue operations under the =
terms=20
of the STCW Convention;
42. Calls on the Commission =
and the=20
Member States to press within the IMO for more stringent=20
international rules in regard to safety training for =
captains,=20
officers and crews, with particular reference to compulsory =
further=20
training and refresher courses in vessel safety, accident=20
management, fire protection, and emergency measures such as =
towing,=20
emergency moorings or combating harmful substances;
43. Believes there should =
be an=20
international programme for cooperation bringing together =
all of the=20
world's vessel inspection systems (MOUs), including a =
centralised=20
and easily accessible database that can be consulted =
rapidly, with a=20
view to ensuring that the movement of vessels between zones =
does not=20
permit the loss of traces or the disappearance of any record =
of=20
offences;
44. Welcomes in this =
context the=20
inspections which EMSA will perform regarding the =
application of the=20
STCW Convention in third countries; stresses that penalties =
are=20
needed in cases of flagrant violation of the Convention, and =
calls=20
on the Commission in particular to take strong action =
against=20
countries which issue certificates of competency for =
merchant=20
shipping officers on false or fraudulent grounds;
45. Calls for measures to =
raise the=20
prestige of maritime occupations and make them more =
attractive to=20
young people in general and young Europeans in =
particular;
46. Expresses its concern =
about the=20
proliferation of counterfeit and fraudulent certificates; =
requests=20
the Commission to establish incentives for crew members to =
inform=20
authorities where these criminal activities are prevalent =
and no=20
corrective action is taken by the owners or flag state;
47. Welcomes the decisions =
adopted by=20
the IMO in December 2003 concerning guidelines for ports of =
refuge=20
and the introduction of a voluntary audit system for IMO =
member=20
states; urges, however, that this system be made compulsory =
without=20
delay and its results published;
48. Is aware of the =
difficulty faced=20
by certain third states in implementing international rules =
on=20
safety at sea; calls therefore on the Council and Commission =
to=20
incorporate in the Community's development policy programmes =
to=20
bolster maritime administrations;
49. Calls for a review of =
the=20
international legislation on maritime transport with a view =
to=20
improving transparency as regards operational structures, =
identity=20
of the operators, type of goods carried and the safety =
measures=20
applying in each case; reiterates the need for measures to =
encourage=20
vessels to fly Community flags rather than flags of =
convenience of=20
countries which do not meet the vessel inspection and safety =
standards;
Socioeconomic, environmental and =
fisheries=20
aspects
50. Notes that the rapid =
opening-up=20
of fishing grounds in the affected areas after the Prestige =
disaster=20
may in the short term have eased the situation of the =
fishing=20
industry concerned, but fears that, in the longer term, this =
decision in combination with overfishing will adversely =
affect fish=20
stocks and the profitability of the industry;
51. Stresses that, one year =
and more=20
on from the Prestige disaster and despite the reduction in=20
extractive activity, information from the local fishermen's=20
associations suggests that there has been a considerable =
shortfall=20
vis-=C3=A0-vis usual catch levels in respect of fish stocks =
in the=20
area;
52. Stresses that under the =
new=20
Community financial perspective (2007-2013) provision must =
be made=20
for specific financial instruments for the fisheries sector =
of a=20
nature suited to the needs of coastal communities affected =
by=20
maritime disasters;
53. Stresses that =
experience of the=20
Exxon Valdez disaster demonstrates the need for long-term =
scientific=20
research into the environmental impact of the Prestige =
disaster;=20
considers that this research should examine, inter alia, the =
knock-on effects of pollution in the food chain and the =
impact of=20
the pollution on biodiversity; urges that agreements be =
reached on=20
the joint financing of such research by the regions and =
Member=20
States concerned and by the EU;
54. Considers that the =
effective role=20
played by fishing fleets in combating pollution from the =
Prestige=20
and in perfecting fuel recovery trawls should encourage EU =
Member=20
States to develop preventively, on a permanent basis, with =
the aid=20
of Community funding, this flexible approach to cleaning up=20
pollution, which makes it possible to act before pollution =
reaches=20
the coast;
55. Hopes that such =
long-term=20
research and exchanges of the research findings will make it =
possible to assess more realistically the immediate and =
delayed=20
damage and thus arrive at a more considered approach to =
future=20
environmental disasters;
56. Considers that the =
Commission=20
should ensure that response to wildlife during an oil spill =
is=20
integrated into the overall oil spill response and planning=20
mechanisms, ensuring that this response is carried out =
according to=20
best practice; considers furthermore that the Commission =
should=20
prioritise the development of adequate measures to restore =
damaged=20
ecosystems following an oil spill and ensure the recovery of =
populations of affected species;
57. Instructs its President =
to=20
forward this resolution to the Council and =
Commission. |